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Abstract	
Conventional	analyses	attribute	cross-country	differences	in	students’	average	test	scores	to	
family	characteristics,	school	resources,	and	school	system	characteristics,	but	institutional	
economists	and	cultural	anthropologists	argue	that	cultural	beliefs	and	institutions	are	the	
fundamental	determinants	of	a	society’s	level	of	human	capital.		I	examine	the	effects	of	cultural	
beliefs,	institutional	characteristics,	family	characteristics,	and	various	school	and	education	
policy	characteristics	on	average	PISA	scores	in	mathematics.		I	find	that	national	cultural	and	
institutional	characteristics	explain	over	80%	of	the	variation	in	average	scores	across	58	
countries.		When	family,	school,	and	school	system	characteristics	are	included	as	causes,	
cultural	and	institutional	characteristics	continue	to	explain	most	of	the	variation	in	average	
scores.		More	financial	resources	for	schools	continue	to	raise	average	scores,	the	existence	of	a	
central	exit	exam	has	a	small	effect,	and	the	share	of	private	enrollment	in	the	school	system	
has	no	effect	on	these	scores.					
	
JEL	Codes:			I21,	O15,	Z19	
Key	Words:		Test	Scores,	Culture,	Institutions,	Education,	PISA,	World	
	
*Universidad	EAFIT,	ted.breton@gmail.com	
	 	
I. Introduction	
An	 increasing	 number	 of	 countries	 participate	 in	 international	 tests	 of	 their	 students’	
cognitive	 skills.	 	 The	 results	 show	 the	 enormous	 variation	 in	 students’	 average	 skills	 across	
countries.	 	On	 the	PISA	2015	 test	of	mathematics,	 the	average	 score	 ranged	 from	328	 in	 the	
Dominican	Republic	to	569	in	Singapore.1				
Researchers	have	analyzed	students’	test	scores	for	decades	to	determine	why	skill	levels	
vary	so	much.		The	standard	conclusion	is	that	individual	scores	vary	due	to	the	effects	of	families,	
peers,	schools,	and	student	ability	[Hanushek	and	Woessmann,	2008].			At	the	country	level	Fuchs	
and	Woessmann	 [2007]	 present	 evidence	 that	 average	 scores	 on	 PISA	 2000	 tests	 are	 higher	
where	 parents	 are	 more	 educated,	 where	 schools	 have	 more	 resources	 and	 are	 privately	
operated,	 and	where	 the	 school	 system	 requires	a	 central	 exit	 exam.	 	 Juerges	and	Schneider	
[2004]	present	evidence	that	average	scores	on	TIMSS	1995	are	higher	where	parents	are	more	
educated	and	schools	have	more	 resources,	but	 they	do	not	 find	any	effect	 from	central	exit	
exams.					
Even	 though	 family	 and	 school	 characteristics	 are	 correlated	with	a	 country’s	 average	
scores,	there	is	reason	to	suspect	that	these	characteristics	are	not	their	principal	determinants.		
Hanushek	 and	Woessmann	 [2008]	 document	 that	 across	 the	world	 in	 response	 to	numerous	
types	of	school	initiatives,	student	achievement	has	been	remarkably	resistant	to	improvement.		
The	 implication	 is	 that	 something	 beyond	 families	 and	 the	 schools	 determines	 a	 country´s	
average	student	achievement.							
The	 economic	 development	 and	 cultural	 anthropology	 literatures	 provide	 alternative	
theories	 to	 explain	 national	 differences	 in	 student	 achievement.	 	 North	 and	 Thomas	 [1973]	
distinguish	between	the	proximate	and	the	fundamental	causes	of	economic	development.		They	
argue	that	physical	and	human	capital	are	the	proximate	determinants	of	economic	growth,	but	
a	 society’s	 institutions,	 and	 particularly	 its	 protection	 of	 property	 rights,	 determine	whether	
physical	and	human	capital	are	created.		North	[1990]	argues	that	institutions,	i.e.,	the	formal	
and	informal	rules	for	human	behavior,	create	the	political,	social,	and	economic	incentives	that	
determine	human	behavior	 in	each	society.	 	Organizations	and	 individuals	operate	within	 the	
institutional	 framework	that	characterizes	each	society.	 	According	to	 this	 theory,	a	country´s	
																																																																		
1	Public	interest	in	a	country’s	average	score	on	international	tests	has	increased	because	there	
is	evidence	that	higher	scores	raise	a	country’s	economic	growth	rate,	at	least	in	countries	with	
low	average	scores	[See	Hanushek	and	Woessmann,	2012	and	Breton,	2015].	
	
institutions	are	the	fundamental	determinants	of	 its	 level	of	human	capital,	which	includes	its	
students´	average	level	of	skills.			
Following	 North’s	 lead,	 Acemoglu,	 Johnson,	 and	 Robinson	 [2006]	 argue	 that	 human	
capital,	which	they	measure	with	adults’	average	level	of	schooling,	is	higher	in	countries	that	
have	more	inclusive	political	institutions.		Their	argument	is	that	countries	with	inclusive	political	
institutions	create	economic	institutions	that	provide	security	for	private	property	and	access	to	
economic	 resources	 for	 a	 substantial	 portion	 of	 their	 citizens.	 	 In	 an	 inclusive	 environment,	
citizens	have	the	incentive	and	the	means	to	invest	in	physical	and	human	capital	and	become	
economically	successful.		Acemoglu,	Gallego,	and	Robinson	[2014]	argue	that	societies	with	more	
inclusive	 institutions	 provide	more	 schooling	 to	 their	 members.	 	 So	 from	 the	 institutionalist	
perspective,	cross-country	differences	in	average	test	scores	are	the	end	result	of	the	differences	
in	the	political	and	economic	institutions	that	determine	human	behavior	in	each	country.			
Cultural	anthropologists	broaden	the	determinants	of	human	behavior	beyond	political	
and	economic	institutions	to	include	cultural	beliefs.		North´s	definition	of	Institutions	includes	
cultural	norms,	which	are	the	practices	that	accompany	cultural	beliefs.		Hofstede	and	Hofstede	
[2005]	argue	that	a	society’s	culture	and	institutions	are	inter-related.		When	attempts	are	made	
to	impose	new	institutions	(i.e.,	new	rules	or	norms)	on	a	society,	these	institutions	change	in	
response	to	the	existing	cultural	beliefs,	but	they	also	affect	these	beliefs.			Societies	with	similar	
cultural	 beliefs	 can	 have	 somewhat	 different	 institutions,	 if	 they	 have	 a	 different	 historical	
experience.		As	a	consequence,	a	society’s	cultural	beliefs	and	its	institutions	could	both	affect	
its	students’	average	test	scores.			
In	 this	 paper	 I	 first	 describe	 the	 channels	 through	 which	 cultural	 and	 institutional	
characteristics	affect	student,	 family,	and	school	behavior	and	ultimately	determine	students’	
average	 skills	 in	 each	 country.	 	 Subsequently,	 I	 analyze	 whether	 cultural	 and	 institutional	
characteristics	explain	cross-country	differences	in	average	scores	on	PISA	2012	and	2015	tests	
of	mathematics.		I	find	that	either	cultural	beliefs	or	a	measure	of	institutional	characteristics	can	
explain	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 cross-country	 variation	 in	 students’	 average	 scores	 across	 58	
countries	and	that	a	combination	of	these	measures	explains	over	80%	of	the	variation	in	these	
scores.			
If	cultural	and	institutional	characteristics	are	the	fundamental	determinants	of	student	
achievement,	then	independent	efforts	within	the	schools	to	raise	students’	average	test	scores	
would	 have	 a	 limited	 effect	 because	 the	 cultural	 and	 institutional	 characteristics	 continue	
unchanged.	 	 I	 test	 this	 hypothesis	 by	 estimating	 the	 effects	 of	 combinations	 of	 institutional,	
cultural,	family,	and	school	characteristics	and	the	existence	of	a	central	exit	exam	on	average	
test	scores.		I	find	that	when	institutional	and	cultural	characteristics	are	included	in	a	model	with	
family	and	school	characteristics,	they	continue	to	have	a	larger	effect	on	average	scores	than	all	
of	 proximate	 factors	 combined	 and	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 central	 exit	 exams	 is	 small	 and	 not	
statistically	significant.						
These	findings	do	not	mean	that	individual	schools	and	teachers	cannot	have	a	positive	
effect	 on	 individual	 student	 achievement.	 	 Indeed,	 schools	 and	 teachers	 constantly	 work	 to	
improve	student	outcomes.		Rather,	the	implication	is	that	in	the	aggregate	the	characteristics	
of	the	national	culture,	operating	through	the	practices	 in	families	and	in	the	schools,	are	the	
principal	determinants	of	student	achievement.		Schools	have	very	little	independent	capability	
to	 raise	 students’	 average	 scores	 because	 they	 act	 as	 agents	 of	 the	 larger	 culture,	 as	 do	 the	
students’	 families.	 	This	means	that	 in	countries	where	students’	average	scores	are	high,	the	
culture	and	institutions	provide	strong	incentives	to	achieve	high	scores.		Schools	and	families	
respond	to	these	incentives	by	exerting	unrelenting	pressure	on	students	to	achieve	high	scores.	
The	rest	of	this	article	is	organized	as	follows:		Section	II	presents	the	hypothesis	in	more	
detail.	 	 Section	 III	 specifies	 the	model	 and	 the	 data	 used	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis.	 	 Section	 IV	
presents	the	results.		Section	V	concludes.			
II. The	Hypothesis	
A	priori	 it	 is	evident	that	cultural	beliefs	and	practices	must	affect	student	 learning,	at	
least	 to	 some	degree.	 	Motivation	 is	 critical	 in	determining	whether	 a	 student	 learns.	 	As	 an	
example,	 in	 low-income	 countries	 poor	 urban	 students	 often	 choose	 whether	 to	 achieve	
cognitive	skills	 in	school	or	to	participate	 in	criminal	gangs.	 	Rich	students	choose	whether	to	
focus	on	achieving	cognitive	skills	or	on	cultivating	relationships	with	members	of	 their	social	
class.	 	 The	 choices	 they	make	 depend	 on	 the	 culture	 (i.e.,	 the	 societal	 beliefs	 about	what	 is	
proper)	 and	 the	 institutions	 in	 their	 country	 because	 these	 factors	 determine	 whether	 the	
achievement	of	cognitive	skills	leads	to	much	economic	and	social	success.		The	potential	rewards	
from	achieving	these	skills	in	each	country	affect	the	effort	that	students	and	their	families	make	
to	achieve	high	test	scores.					
Dang	and	Rogers	[2008]	document	the	substantial	commitments	that	families	make	to	
provide	private	tutoring	for	their	children	in	some	countries.		The	commitment	to	private	tutoring	
is	entirely	voluntary	and	is	separate	from	the	educational	activity	within	the	schools.		This	family	
commitment	must	be	due	to	the	cultural	and	institutional	characteristics	of	these	societies,	which	
evidently	provide	either	particularly	high	social	and/or	economic	rewards	for	the	achievement	of	
high	test	scores,	or	particularly	severe	penalties	for	the	failure	to	achieve	high	scores.				
The	conventional	explanations	of	the	determinants	of	student	test	scores	do	not	iclude	
the	effects	of	culture	and	 institutions.	 	 Instead	they	examine	the	effects	of	 family	and	school	
characteristics,	which	are	the	proximate	determinants	of	these	scores.		Fuchs	and	Woessmann	
[2007]	perform	a	principal	components’	analysis	of	the	effects	of	five	categories	of	factors	on	
average	 PISA	 2000	 scores	 in	 32	 countries.	 	 They	 show	 that	when	 included	 alone,	 the	 family	
characteristics	 category	 has	 the	 largest	 effect,	 explaining	 49%	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 average	
mathematics	scores	across	countries.		The	parents’	level	of	schooling,	which	they	assume	has	a	
uniform	effect	across	countries,	is	a	particularly	influential	component	of	these	characteristics.							
Figure	 1	 shows	 the	 relationship	 between	 average	 test	 scores	 on	 the	 PISA	 tests	 of	
mathematics	in	2012	and/or	2015	and	the	average	schooling	attainment	of	adults	age	35-40	in	
2010.		These	adults	have	the	approximate	age	of	the	parents	of	the	students	that	took	the	PISA	
tests	in	2012	and	2015.		The	schooling	data	are	taken	from	Barro	and	Lee	[2013].			
Figure	1	
Average	Scores	on	PISA	Tests	vs.	Adults’	Average	Schooling	Attainment	
	
The	pattern	 in	 the	data	 shows	 that	 there	 is	a	high	correlation	 (ρ	=	0.73)	between	 the	
students’	average	scores	and	the	average	schooling	of	adults	their	parents’	age.		This	correlation	
is	consistent	with	the	relationship	consistently	found	between	parental	education	and	student	
scores	on	the	international	tests.			
Nevertheless,	certain	patterns	in	the	data	indicate	that	cultural	characteristics	also	affect	
average	scores.		The	East	Asian	countries	have	average	test	scores	that	are	substantially	higher	
than	other	countries	that	have	the	same	average	levels	of	adult	schooling.		Portugal,	which	has	
an	unusually	 low	average	level	of	adult	schooling	for	Europe,	has	average	test	scores	that	are	
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similar	to	the	average	scores	in	the	other	Catholic	Mediterranean	countries.		Average	scores	are	
considerably	lower	but	quite	similar	in	all	the	countries	in	Latin	America.					
Many	countries	in	East	Asia	have	had	a	long	exposure	to	the	dominant	Chinese	culture	in	
the	region,	in	which	government	officials	have	been	selected	by	examination	for	over	a	thousand	
years.		These	countries	have	adopted	this	ancient	practice	to	determine	which	students	should	
be	 selected	 for	more	 advanced	 study,	 or	 for	 entry	 into	 the	most	 prestigious	 schools,	 which	
subsequently	determines	access	to	the	most	prestigious	organizations	after	graduation.			
A	 societal	 emphasis	 on	 standardized	 testing	 for	 advancement	 creates	 an	 enormous	
incentive	for	families	to	pressure	their	children	to	work	hard,	perhaps	excessively	hard,	to	achieve	
high	 scores.	 	 As	 a	 consequence,	most	 families	 in	 East	 Asian	 countries	 that	 have	 a	 Confucian	
tradition	send	their	children	for	private	tutoring,	and	in	South	Korea	families	expend	almost	3%	
of	GDP	on	this	activity	[Dang	and	Rogers,	2008].		This	heavy	societal	emphasis	on	test	results	is	
effective	in	raising	student	achievement,	as	demonstrated	by	the	unusually	high	PISA	scores	in	
many	East	Asian	countries.		Even	Vietnam,	which	is	a	very	poor	country	with	low	average	levels	
of	adult	schooling,	has	impressively	high	average	scores	on	the	PISA	mathematics	test.		
Breton	 and	 Canavire-Bacarreza	 [2017]	 investigate	 why	 Latin	 American	 countries	 had	
average	scores	on	the	PISA	2012	mathematics	test	that	are	100	points	below	the	average	scores	
in	 Scandinavian	 countries.	 	 Families	 in	 Latin	 America	 have	 a	 much	 lower	 average	 level	 of	
schooling.		But	in	addition,	they	show	that	the	parents’	level	of	education	in	Latin	America	has	a	
much	 smaller	effect	on	 their	 children’s	 scores	 than	 in	Scandinavia.	 	 They	also	document	 that	
families	in	Latin	America	have	far	fewer	books	in	the	home	than	other	countries	with	the	same	
levels	of	GDP/adult	or	average	schooling.		This	difference	explains	about	25	points	of	the	lower	
average	PISA	scores	in	this	region	compared	to	other	regions.	 	Breton	and	Canavire-Bacarreza	
argue	that	the	low	number	of	books	is	a	cultural	effect,	likely	related	to	the	restrictive	religious	
controls	on	 the	publication	and	 importation	of	books	 in	Latin	America	prior	 to	 independence	
from	Spain	and	Portugal.									
Perhaps	more	importantly,	a	country’s	culture	and	institutions	explain	the	average	level	
of	 adult	 schooling	 in	 the	 population.	 	 Schools	 have	 existed	 for	 thousands	 of	 years,	 but	 the	
schooling	of	the	masses	did	not	begin	until	the	19th	century	[Easterlin,	1981].		Countries	in	which	
adults	have	a	high	average	level	of	schooling	today	provided	substantial	schooling	to	the	masses	
much	earlier	than	other	countries.		The	willingness	to	provide	this	schooling	depended	in	part	on	
the	perceived	importance	of	educating	the	poor	in	each	culture	[Breton,	2013].			
III. The	Model	and	the	Data	
Schools	are	a	societal	 institution,	which	have	as	one	of	their	objectives	the	transfer	of	
societal	beliefs	and	practices	to	the	next	generation	[Bowen,	1986].		Public	schools	are	directly	
under	the	control	of	the	government,	and	in	democratic	societies	they	also	are	guided	formally	
and	informally	by	parents	and	other	citizens.		Public	schools	are	more	accountable	to	political	
organizations,	 while	 private	 schools	 are	 more	 accountable	 to	 religious	 organizations	 or	 to	
parents.		But	regardless	of	their	ownership	structure,	all	schools	must	operate	in	ways	that	are	
acceptable	to	the	religious	authorities,	political	authorities,	and	parents	in	each	country.			
Conceptually,	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 culture,	 the	 political	 and	 religious	
organizations,	 the	educational	 system,	 families,	 and	 student	achievement	 can	be	modeled	as	
shown	 in	 Figure	 2.	 	 Since	 the	 political	 or	 religious	 organizations	 that	 manage	 schools	 are	
composed	of	 individuals	who	 in	 the	aggregate	have	 the	cultural	beliefs	 characteristic	of	 their	
society,	the	behavior	of	these	organizations	is	itself	affected,	if	not	entirely	determined,	by	the	
societies’	particular	cultural	beliefs	and	institutions.			
Figure	2	
Societal	Determinants	of	Students’	Average	Test	Scores
	
The	average	level	of	student	achievement	is	determined	by	the	operation	of	the	societal	
system	that	manages	children	and	affects	their	behavior.	 	 In	this	process	schools	have	a	 large	
role,	but	their	operation	is	constrained	by	the	other	components	of	the	system.	 	The	schools’	
effort	to	train	students	is	a	joint	activity	with	the	students´	families,	who	may	supplement	their	
own	efforts	with	private	tutoring	and	other	private	instruction.			
As	implied	in	the	figure,	schools	manage	children	in	ways	that	are	acceptable	to	society,	
whether	through	the	form	of	discipline,	or	the	teacher-student	relationship,	or	the	hours	inside	
and	outside	of	school	that	children	are	expected	to	dedicate	to	their	studies.	 	Outside	forces,	
such	as	foreign	educational	practices,	may	influence	domestic	practices,	but	these	practices	are	
unlikely	to	be	accepted	or	successful	if	they	are	inconsistent	with	the	domestic	culture.			
Student	achievement	of	high	average	test	scores	is	difficult	and	requires	enormous	
effort	on	the	part	of	the	students	and	their	parents.		The	amount	of	effort	expended	is	
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determined	by	the	motivation	of	the	students	and	their	parents	to	make	this	effort,	which	is	
largely	outside	the	control	of	the	schools.		This	motivation	is	determined	by	the	characteristics	
of	the	culture,	which	determine	the	importance	of	student	learning	for	social	and	economic	
success.			This	importance	is	evident	in	the	benefits	that	society	provides	students	for	mastering	
cognitive	skills,	either	through	awards	and	recognition,	or	by	providing	access	to	additional	or	
more	prestigious	schooling	and	subsequently	to	higher-status	careers	or	better-paying	jobs.			
Culture	in	this	model	includes	both	the	society’s	beliefs	and	its	practices.		If	the	culture	
includes	 the	 belief	 that	 merit	 should	 determine	 schooling	 and	 work	 opportunities,	 then	 the	
educational	 institutions	will	 set	 up	 processes	 to	 implement	 these	 beliefs,	 such	 as	 centralized	
examinations,	and	the	schools	and	families	are	likely	to	respond	to	these	incentives	by	pressuring	
students	to	achieve	high	test	scores.		In	the	absence	of	these	incentives,	the	students	are	unlikely	
to	achieve	such	high	scores.		
The	level	of	rewards	a	society	provides	its	students	for	scholastic	achievement	is	related	
to	the	inclusiveness	of	its	institutions.		Societies	with	more	inclusive	institutions	are	more	likely	
to	select	individuals	for	further	study	or	for	desirable	jobs	based	on	merit,	while	societies	with	
less	inclusive	institutions	are	more	likely	to	make	these	selections	based	on	social	relationships.		
In	societies	that	function	based	on	social	relationships,	there	is	little	material	benefit	to	students	
and	families	from	expending	intensive	effort	to	achieve	high	scores	on	standardized	tests,	so	we	
should	not	expect	that	students	in	countries	less	inclusive	institutions	would	score	highly.	
Other	 researchers	have	 investigated	 the	 relationship	between	certain	elements	of	 the	
conceptual	 model	 shown	 in	 Figure	 2.	 	 French,	 French,	 and	 Li	 [2015]	 show	 that	 cultural	
characteristics	affect	expenditures	on	education,	which	then	affect	average	scores	on	PISA	tests.		
Zhang,	 Khan,	 and	 Tahirsylaj	 [2015]	 categorize	 countries	 into	 cultural	 clusters	 based	 on	 the	
variance	in	average	PISA	test	scores	across	schools	within	countries	and	then	show	that	these	
cultural	clusters	explain	about	half	of	the	variation	in	average	test	scores	across	countries.			
2a	 Model	of	the	Effect	of	Culture	on	Average	Test	Scores	
In	this	analysis	I	examine	how	well	the	cross-country	variation	in	average	test	scores	can	
be	explained	by	societal,	educational,	and	family	characteristics,	so	the	mathematical	model	is	
quite	simple:	
1)	 AvgScorei	=	α0	+	∑	αj	Xij	+	εi	
AvgScore	 represents	 the	average	score	on	 the	PISA	mathematics	 test	 in	each	country	 i	and	X	
represents	 the	 set	 of	 each	 country´s	 j	 characteristics.	 	 	 Since	 these	 characteristics	 are	 the	
fundamental	and/or	the	proximate	causes	of	the	creation	of	human	capital	in	each	country,	there	
are	no	control	variables	in	the	model.			
The	average	score	is	the	national	score	on	the	mathematics	test	in	PISA	2012	and/or	PISA	
2015.	 	 I	use	the	average	of	the	two	scores	when	both	are	available.	 	Since	each	set	of	scores	
includes	some	error	as	the	true	measure	of	students’	average	skills,	this	error	is	likely	to	be	lower	
in	 the	 average	 score	 from	 two	 tests.	 	 Since	 average	 scores,	 cultural	 beliefs,	 and	 institutional	
characteristics	change	very	slowly,	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	that	any	change	in	the	average	
scores	over	this	three-year	period	is	due	to	changes	in	the	independent	variables.		Using	scores	
from	 both	 years	 also	 permits	 the	 inclusion	 of	 several	 countries	 in	 the	 data	 set	 that	 did	 not	
participate	in	both	tests,	which	increases	the	number	of	less	educated	countries	in	the	sample.			
As	described	below,	I	use	a	combination	of	variables	to	define	a	country’s	culture,	educational,	
and	family	characteristics.			
2c	 Measures	of	Cultural	Characteristics	
Numerous	 researchers	 have	 attempted	 to	 identify	 and	 measure	 a	 society’s	 cultural	
characteristics.		These	characteristics	are	measures	of	individuals’	beliefs	about	how	individuals	
should	behave	in	society.		Since	these	beliefs	are	somewhat	amorphous,	there	is	no	unique	way	
to	define	or	categorize	a	society’s	set	of	beliefs.	 	Different	researchers	have	created	different	
categories	of	measures	to	characterize	these	beliefs.		
Geert	Hofstede	created	a	set	of	five	cultural	characteristics	to	explain	individual	beliefs	or	
behavior	across	a	wide	variety	of	cultures	[Hofstede	and	Hofstede,	2005]:			
1. Power	Distance	(Accept	that	society	is	hierarchical	and	hierarchy	confers	authority)	
2. Individualism/collectivism	(Accept	that	the	individual,	not	the	group,	makes	decisions)	
3. Masculinity/femininity	(Success-oriented	rather	than	relationship-oriented)	
4. Uncertainty	Avoidance	(Comfortable	with	strict	societal	beliefs	and	rules)	
5. Long-term	Orientation	(Willing	to	sacrifice	short	term	to	achieve	future	rewards)	
These	five	characteristics	emerged	using	principal	factor	analysis	from	answers	to	a	large	
array	of	questions	about	beliefs	among	IBM	sales	executives	in	many	countries.		As	such,	they	
represent	the	beliefs	of	the	middle	rather	than	the	lower	classes,	which	likely	correspond	to	the	
beliefs	of	the	individuals	that	direct	a	country’s	political	and	economic	institutions.		The	first	four	
characteristics	were	identified	in	Western	cultures,	while	the	fifth	characteristic	emerged	from	
comparing	Western	and	Eastern,	particularly	Asian,	cultures.		Factor	analysis	also	indicated	that	
these	five	characteristics	include	the	principal	cultural	characteristics	identified	as	important	by	
other	anthropologists	[Hofstede	and	Hofstede,	2005].			
I	use	Hofstede’s	set	of	cultural	characteristics	rather	than	another	set	because	his	system	
has	been	 applied	 to	 almost	 all	 of	 the	 countries	 that	 participated	 in	 the	PISA	 tests.	 	 For	 each	
country	I	obtained	its	rating	for	each	of	the	five	cultural	belief	categories	from	the	Hofstede	web	
site:	 https://www.geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html.	 	 These	 ratings	 are	 based	 on	
surveys	undertaken	between	1967	and	1973	in	a	core	group	of	countries	and	then	extended	to	
other	countries	over	time.					
Cultural	beliefs	change,	so	they	are	endogenous	in	the	economic	development	process.		
Hofstede	and	Hofstede	[2005]	argue,	however,	that	even	if	beliefs	change	somewhat	over	time,	
the	large	differences	in	beliefs	between	societies	are	relatively	stable,	so	ratings	developed	years	
ago	 continue	 to	 have	 validity	 as	 a	measure	 of	 a	 society’s	 cultural	 beliefs	 compared	 to	 other	
countries.	 	 As	 an	 example,	 Latin	 American	 countries	 have	 similar	 cultural	 beliefs	 today	 even	
though	they	have	been	politically	independent	for	about	200	years.			
2b	 Measures	of	Institutional	Characteristics	
Societies	can	also	be	described	by	their	institutional	characteristics.		Acemoglu,	Johnson,	
and	 Robinson	 [2006]	 argue	 that	 countries	 with	 more	 inclusive	 political	 institutions	 create	
economic	institutions	that	provide	their	members	with	incentives	to	invest	in	physical	and	human	
capital.		They	use	an	index	of	the	perceived	risk	of	expropriation	as	their	measure	of	institutions.		
Acemoglu,	Gallego,	and	Robinson	[2014]	and	numerous	other	researchers	have	used	an	index	of	
commitment	to	the	Rule	of	Law	as	their	measure	of	institutions.		These	two	indices	are	highly	
correlated,	but	the	Rule	of	Law	measure	is	more	reliable	because	there	are	more	objective	ways	
to	measure	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 judicial	 system	 than	 the	 probability	 that	 the	 executive	may	
expropriate	private	property.		According	to	the	World	Bank	on	its	web	site,	the	Rule	of	Law	Index	
“…captures	perceptions	of	the	extent	to	which	agents	have	confidence	in	and	abide	by	the	rules	
of	society,	and	in	particular	the	quality	of	contract	enforcement,	property	rights,	the	police,	and	
the	courts,	as	well	as	the	likelihood	of	crime	and	violence.”	
Acemoglu,	Gallego,	 and	Robinson	 [2014]	 argue	 that	 the	Rule	 of	 Law	 index	 provides	 a	
broad	measure	of	a	country’s	institutions.		This	index	implicitly	measures	the	relative	inclusivity	
of	the	country´s	institutions.		Countries	with	a	higher	commitment	to	the	rule	of	law	treat	citizens	
more	equally,	which	corresponds	to	a	set	of	formal	and	informal	ways	of	doing	things	that	provide	
more	equal	opportunities	for	all.		This	index	measures	much	more	than	the	characteristics	of	a	
country´s	judicial	operations.		In	societies	with	high	adherence	to	the	rule	of	law,	social	status	is	
a	less	important	determinant	of	whether	individuals	can	progress	irrespective	of	their	social	class.		
More	 inclusive	 societies	 provide	 greater	 rewards	 to	 individuals	 based	 on	 their	 capability	 to	
contribute	to	the	economy,	which	provide	an	incentive	for	students	to	develop	useful	skills	and	
for	families	to	encourage	them	to	learn	these	skills.			
Countries	more	committed	to	the	rule	of	 law	are	more	egalitarian,	so	they	tend	to	be	
more	willing	 to	provide	public	 funds	 for	 the	 schooling	of	 their	 citizens.	 	 Since	 societal	beliefs	
change	slowly	over	long	periods,	the	adults	in	these	countries	are	likely	to	have	received	more	
schooling	when	they	were	children,	which	enables	them	to	provide	more	assistance	to	their	own	
children	in	their	acquisition	of	useful	skills.			
This	 line	of	argument	provides	one	explanation	for	the	high	correlation	between	adult	
schooling	and	students’	test	scores	in	Figure	1.		In	this	view	higher	average	schooling	and	higher	
test	 scores	 are	 both	 the	 result	 of	 long-standing	 cultural	 and	 institutional	 characteristics	 that	
support	the	acquisition	of	human	capital.				
The	World	Bank’s	index	for	the	Rule	of	Law	extends	from	-2.5	to	2.5.		I	convert	this	index	
to	one	that	has	values	between	0	and	1	by	adding	2.5	and	dividing	by	5.	 	Figure	3	shows	that	
average	adult	schooling	at	age	35-40	years	is	correlated	across	countries	with	this	modified	Rule	
of	Law	index	(ρ	=	0.56).					
									Figure	3	
Adults’	Average	Schooling	in	2010	vs.	the	Rule	of	Law	in	2013	
	
	
	
2c	 The	Link	Between	Culture	and	Institutional	Characteristics	
Klasing	[2013]	argues	that	it	is	hard	to	think	of	a	country’s	culture	(i.e.,	its	shared	values	
and	 beliefs)	 as	 distinct	 from	 its	 institutions	 (i.e.,	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	 rules	 that	 regulate	
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human	 interaction).	 	 Since	 institutions	 are	 composed	 of	 individuals,	 they	must	 operate	 in	 a	
fashion	that	is	consistent	with	the	society’s	cultural	beliefs.		But	institutions	are	also	affected	by	
political	and	military	developments,	so	countries	that	have	similar	cultural	beliefs	(e.g.,	countries	
in	Latin	America)	may	have	somewhat	different	institutions	based	on	each	country’s	particular	
history.			
Societies	that	have	a	low	Rule	of	Law	index	(i.e.,	a	low	commitment	to	the	rule	of	law)	
have	cultural	beliefs	that	permit	government	bodies	to	treat	individuals	differently	depending	on	
their	social	status.		Klasing	[2013]	examines	a	range	of	potential	cultural	characteristics	and	shows	
that	two	of	Hofstede´s	characteristics,	Individualism	and	Acceptance	of	hierarchy,	explain	50%	of	
the	difference	 in	several	measures	of	the	quality	of	government	 institutions,	which	are	highly	
correlated	with	 the	Rule	of	 Law	 index.	 	 Individualism	has	a	positive	effect	and	Acceptance	of	
hierarchy	has	a	negative	effect	on	the	quality	of	government	institutions.	 	 	Licht,	Godschmidt,	
and	 Schwartz	 [2007]	 present	 similar	 evidence	 connecting	 Collectivism	 and	 Acceptance	 of	
hierarchy	to	the	World	Bank’s	Rule	of	Law	index.		
Given	that	Hofstede’s	two	cultural	characteristics	explain	only	half	of	the	cross-country	
variation	in	the	measure	of	institutions,	it	seems	that	either	societies’	cultural	beliefs	have	not	
been	adequately	 characterized,	 the	measures	of	 these	beliefs	are	not	 sufficiently	accurate	 to	
entirely	explain	a	country’s	institutional	characteristics,	or	a	country’s	institutional	characteristics	
are	an	important	element	of	its	culture	but	somewhat	distinct	from	individuals’	cultural	beliefs.		
Regardless	of	which	is	correct,	the	implication	is	that	a	more	complete	description	of	a	country’s	
culture	includes	both	its	cultural	beliefs	and	its	institutional	characteristics.			
2d	 Religion	as	a	Measure	of	Culture	
Historically	societies	have	been	defined	to	a	considerable	degree	by	their	adherence	to	a	
particular	 religion.	 	 Although	 religion	 has	 lost	 influence	 in	 many	 societies,	 adherence	 to	 a	
particular	 religion	 still	 defines	 or	 affects	 many	 cultural	 beliefs,	 including	 individualism,	
acceptance	of	hierarchy,	and	uncertainty	avoidance.		It	seems	reasonable	to	examine	whether	
adherence	to	the	world’s	major	religious	ideologies	can	explain	a	country’	average	test	scores.		
In	 this	 investigation	 I	 examine	 the	 effect	 of	 three	 religious	 traditions	 that	 are	 widely	
spread:	Protestant,	Catholic,	and	Muslim.			Other	traditions	that	are	less	widely	spread,	such	as	
Orthodox	Christianity,	Judaism,	Buddhism,	Hinduism,	and	atheism,	constitute	the	base	against	
which	the	effect	of	these	three	traditions	are	measured.		The	variables	in	the	model	are	the	share	
of	the	population	adhering	to	each	of	these	religions	 in	1980,	taken	from	La	Porta,	Lopez-de-
Silanes,	Shleifer,	and	Vishny	[1999],	who	obtained	the	data	from	Barrett	[1982].		I	also	identify	
the	East	Asian	countries	that	have	a	Confucian	tradition	with	a	dummy	variable.			
2e	 Family	and	School	Characteristics					
Fuchs	and	Woessmann	[2007]	show	that	family,	school,	and	school	system	characteristics	
are	influential	in	determining	a	country’s	average	test	scores.		I	include	variables	for	each	of	these	
sets	of	characteristics.		I	represent	family	characteristics	with	the	average	schooling	of	the	adults	
age	35-40	in	each	country	in	2010.		This	variable	is	similar	to	the	average	schooling	of	the	parents	
of	the	15-year-old	students	presenting	the	PISA	test	in	2012	and	2015.		This	is	the	same	variable	
shown	in	Figure	1.			
I	 employ	 two	 variables	 to	 represent	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 resources	 provided	 to	 the	
schools.		The	first	variable	is	the	pupil-teacher	ratio	in	primary	school	in	2012,	which	I	obtained	
from	the	UNESCO	web	site.		The	second	variable	is	the	share	of	GDP	provided	for	pre-tertiary	
public	education	in	2012	divided	by	the	share	of	the	population	under	15	years	of	age	in	2010.		
This	variable	is	a	measure	of	the	relative	public	expenditures/student	in	each	country.			I	calculate	
the	share	of	GDP	provided	for	pre-tertiary	schooling	from	statistics	on	total	public	investment	in	
schooling	and	the	share	for	tertiary	schooling	on	the	UNESCO	web	site.		I	calculate	the	share	of	
the	population	under	15	from	data	on	GDP/capita	and	GDP/equivalent	adult	in	Penn	World	Table	
7.1	[Heston,	Summers,	and	Aten,	2012].			
I	employ	two	variables	to	describe	the	institutional	characteristics	of	the	school	system,	
the	existence	of	a	 central	exit	exam	and	 the	 share	of	 secondary	 school	enrollment	 in	private	
schools.	 	 I	 obtain	 information	 about	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 central	 exit	 exam	 from	 Leschnig,	
Schwerdt,	 and	 Zigova	 [2016]	 and	 Bol,	Witschge,	 Van	 de	Werfhorst	 and	 Dronkers	 [2014]	 and	
elsewhere	for	the	countries	not	included	in	these	sources.			I	obtain	the	private	share	of	secondary	
enrollment	in	2012	from	the	UNESCO	web	site.		The	key	data	are	provided	in	the	Appendix.					
IV. Results	
Table	 1	 presents	 the	 results	 from	 models	 that	 investigate	 the	 relationship	 between	
average	test	scores	and	a	series	of	cultural	and	institutional	characteristics.		Column	1	presents	
the	results	with	Hofstede’s	five	cultural	characteristics.		Overall	the	five	characteristics	explain	
57%	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 average	 test	 scores,	 but	 only	 Long-Term	 Orientation	 is	 statistically	
significant	at	the	5%	level.			
In	 the	 statistical	 relationship	 between	 the	 average	 test	 scores	 and	 the	 five	 cultural	
characteristics,	the	East	Asian	countries	with	a	Confucian	tradition	are	outliers,	in	that	they	have	
much	higher	scores	than	other	countries	with	similar	cultural	characteristics.		This	same	situation	
is	evident	in	Figure	1,	where	these	same	countries	have	average	scores	that	are	not	explained	by	
the	 average	 level	 of	 adult	 schooling.	 	 The	 implication	 is	 that	 an	 additional	 cultural	 factor	 is	
required	to	explain	average	scores	in	these	countries,	namely	their	Confucian	tradition.			
Column	 2	 presents	 the	 results	 of	 the	 model	 that	 includes	 a	 dummy	 variable	 for	 the	
countries	with	a	Confucian	tradition,	most	of	which	have	substantial	Chinese	populations.		The	
dummy	variable	is	highly	statistically-significant	and	explains	96	points	of	the	PISA	test	scores.		
Overall	this	model	explains	74%	of	the	variation	in	average	test	scores,	and	three	of	Hofstede’s	
cultural	characteristics	are	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.			
Table	1	
The	Effect	of	Culture	and	Institutions	on	Average	Test	Scores	
(Dependent	variable	is	the	average	score	on	PISA	2012	and/or	2015)		
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
Sample	 58	 57	 58	 60	 60	 58	 58	 58	
Individualism	 46.5	
(27.2)	
126.0*	
(25.6)	
138.4*	
(17.4)	
	 	 67.6*	
(24.6)	
48.3**	
(21.4)	
45.7	
(23.4)	
Power	
Distance	
-62.7	
(30.5)	
-26.9	
(24.9)	
	 	 	 17.0	
(22.7)	
	 	
Masculinity	 -15.0	
(22.8)	
-37.2**	
(18.4)	
-41.0**	
(17.5)	
	 	 -18.7	
(15.8)	
	 	
Uncertainty	
Avoidance	
-30.8	
(21.8)	
15.7	
(19.0)	
	 	 	 19.0	
(15.9)	
	 	
Long	Term	
Orientation	
137.2*	
(21.1)	
68.0*	
(20.6)	
67.6*	
(18.6)	
	 	 61.6*	
(17.3)	
72.5*	
(15.6)	
72.6*	
(15.6)	
Confucian	
Tradition	
	 96.9*	
(17.0)	
95.6*	
(14.6)	
	 68.8*	
(12.7)	
71.4*	
(15.1)	
60.2*	
(13.4)	
59.2*	
(13.9)	
Rule	of	Law	 	 	 	 217.5*	
(27.0)	
206.3*	
(22.2)	
147.7*	
(30.7)	
146.1*	
(26.3)	
150.5*	
(30.7)	
Constant	 443.6*	
(29.8)	
389.9*	
(25.3)	
381.5*	
(13.8)	
326.7*	
(18.4)	
327.2*	
(15.0)	
290.4*	
(29.5)	
309.6*	
(13.5)	
308.0*	
(14.7)	
R2	 .57	 .74	 .73	 .53	 .69	 .82	 .81	 .81	
*Statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level.		
**Statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	
	
Some	cultures	are	more	oriented	toward	group	rather	than	 individual	advancement	 in	
groups,	such	as	the	family	or	the	business	organization.		Individual	capability	is	less	important	in	
these	cultures	than	the	individual´s	willingness	to	follow	the	leader	of	the	group.		The	statistical	
results	 in	 the	 various	models	 show	 that	 students	 score	 lower	 on	 international	 tests	 in	 these	
societies.		Implicitly,	since	scoring	well	on	tests	of	individual	skill	is	valued	less	highly,	students,	
their	families,	and	the	schools	exert	less	effort	to	achieve	cognitive	skills	in	these	societies.			
A	long	term	orientation	is	critical	for	the	achievement	of	high	test	scores.		High	scores	at	
age	15	are	the	result	of	disciplined	study	from	early	childhood.		Parents	must	sacrifice	for	a	long	
time	if	their	children	are	to	attain	this	level	of	cognitive	skills.				
The	 importance	 of	 Individualism	 for	 high	 test	 scores	 surges	 in	 the	 model	 once	 the	
Confucian	dummy	is	added.	 	Confucian	countries	are	unusual	 in	having	 low	Individualism	and	
high	test	scores,	apparently	due	to	the	Confucian	tradition	of	reliance	on	standardized	testing	for	
selecting	 government	 officials.	 	 In	 this	 model	 the	 Individualism	 and	 Long-Term	 Orientation	
cultural	characteristics	have	a	very	large	positive	effect	on	average	scores,	while	the	Masculinity	
characteristic	has	a	substantial	negative	effect	on	scores.			Since	the	Scandinavian	countries	score	
low	on	the	Masculinity	index,	this	result	likely	is	due	to	the	relatively	high	test	scores	in	these	
countries.			
The	results	in	model	2	suggest	that	there	are	two	different	cultural	traditions	that	lead	to	
high	test	scores.	 	Western	countries	with	a	strong	cultural	belief	 in	 Individualism	score	highly	
because	individual	achievement	is	rewarded	in	these	societies.		East	Asian	societies	do	not	have	
a	strong	belief	in	Individualism,	but	they	have	a	tradition	of	standardized	testing	for	the	selection	
of	employees,	which	also	provides	rewards	for	high	test	scores.				
Column	 3	 shows	 that	 the	 three	 cultural	 characteristics	 and	 the	 dummy	 variable	 for	
Confucian	tradition	explain	73%	of	the	variation	in	average	scores	across	58	countries.			These	
results	provide	evidence	that	cultural	characteristics	largely	determine	a	country’s	average	scores	
on	the	PISA	mathematics	test.				
Column	4	examines	whether	 the	Rule	of	 Law	 index	also	explains	average	 scores.	 	 The	
effect	of	this	 index	on	average	scores	 is	highly	statistically	significant.	 	This	single	 institutional	
characteristic	explains	53%	of	the	variation	in	average	scores,	supporting	Acemoglu,	Gallego,	and	
Robinson’s	argument	that	institutions	determine	a	country’s	level	of	human	capital.			
Column	5	shows	that	when	the	Confucian	tradition	dummy	is	added,	the	Rule	of	Law	and	
this	tradition	explain	69%	of	the	variation	in	test	scores	across	60	countries.2		Column	6	presents	
the	 results	 when	 the	 six	 cultural	 characteristics	 and	 the	 one	 institutional	 characteristic	 are	
included	in	the	model.	 	 In	this	model	the	Masculinity	cultural	characteristic	 loses	its	statistical	
significance,	but	the	Individualism	and	Long-Term	Orientation	characteristics	remain	statistically	
significant	at	the	1%	level	and	the	explained	variation	in	average	test	scores	increases	to	82%.			
Column	7	shows	that	four	societal	characteristics;	Individualism,	Long-Term	Orientation,	
Rule	of	Law,	and	Confucian	tradition	explain	81%	of	the	variation	in	average	test	scores	across	58	
countries.		Column	8	shows	the	same	model	estimated	using	2SLS	and	the	World	Bank	Rule	of	
Law	index	in	1996	as	an	instrument	for	the	index	in	2013.		The	results	are	similar,	indicating	that	
																																																																		
2	This	sample	size	is	slightly	larger	because	two	countries	in	the	data	set	lack	values	for	the	long-
run	orientation	cultural	characteristic	in	the	Hofstede	data	base.	
the	OLS	estimates	of	the	model	in	column	7	are	not	biased	due	to	the	possible	endogeneity	of	
the	Rule	of	Law	index.		
Table	2	presents	the	analysis	that	examines	whether	commitment	to	a	major	religion	or	
to	Confucian	thought	explains	the	cross-country	variation	in	average	test	scores.		Column	1	shows	
the	effects	of	the	three	religions	alone.		These	results	summarize	the	difference	in	the	average	
score	 associated	 with	 each	 religion,	 which	 explains	 26%	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 average	 scores.		
Protestant	 affiliation	 raises	 average	 scores	 by	 20	points	while	 Catholic	 and	Muslim	affiliation	
lower	average	scores	by	45	and	95	points,	respectively.		Adding	the	Confucian	tradition	raises	the	
explained	variation	to	43%	without	changing	the	relative	scores	between	the	religious	affiliations.		
The	explained	variation	 in	 this	model	 is	much	 lower	 than	what	was	explained	by	 the	cultural	
beliefs	and	Rule	of	Law	index	in	Table	1.			
Table	2	
The	Effect	of	Religion	on	Average	Test	Scores	
(Dependent	variable	is	the	average	score	on	PISA	2012	and/or	2015)		
	 1	 2	 3	 4	
Sample	 58	 58	 56	 56	
Protestant	 20.1	
(26.1)	
63.6**	
(25.8)	
30.0	
(19.7)	
-5.2	
(17.7)	
Catholic	 -45.3**	
(19.3)	
-3.0	
(20.4)	
5.2	
(14.5)	
-7.8	
(12.2)	
Muslim	 -94.9*	
(28.5)	
-51.2	
(27.8)	
-23.9	
(21.5)	
-26.5	
(17.6)	
Individualism	 	 	 110.2*	
(21.6)	
44.4**	
(22.1)	
Long	Term	Orientation	 	 	 77.7*	
(21.2)	
72.8*	
(16.6)	
Confucian	Tradition	 	 83.1*	
(21.4)	
86.9*	
(16.8)	
53.8*	
(15.3)	
Rule	of	Law	 	 	 	 145.9*	
(29.3)	
Constant	 494.5*	
(13.6)	
457.6*	
(15.4)	
366.3*	
(16.2)	
318.2*	
(16.5)	
R2	 .26	 .43	 .74	 .83	
*Statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level.		
**Statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	
	
When	the	two	cultural	beliefs,	Individualism	and	Long-term	orientation,	are	added	to	the	
model	 in	 column	 3,	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 religions	 decline	 and	 become	 statistically	 insignificant.			
When	the	Rule	of	Law	 index	 is	added	 in	column	4,	 the	effects	of	 the	 three	 religions	diminish	
further.	 	The	effect	of	affiliation	to	Islam	still	 lowers	scores	by	27	points,	but	this	effect	 is	not	
statistically	significant.		These	results	indicate	that	the	Hofstede	cultural	characteristics	and	the	
Rule	 of	 Law	 institutional	 characteristic	 are	 the	 more	 valid	 determinants	 of	 the	 variation	 in	
average	scores.							
If	 cultural	 and	 institutional	 characteristics	 are	 the	 fundamental	 causes	of	 average	 test	
scores,	 then	 they	 must	 continue	 to	 be	 statistically	 significant	 in	 a	 model	 that	 includes	 the	
proximate	causes.		Table	3	shows	model	results	beginning	with	variables	for	the	proximate	causes	
and	then	adding	the	variables	for	the	more	fundamental	cultural	and	institutional	causes.	
			Table	3	
Effect	of	Family	and	School	Characteristics,	Culture,	and	Institutions	on	Average	Scores	
(Dependent	variable	is	average	score	on	PISA	2012	and/or	2015)	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	
Sample	 57	 56	 57	 57	 57	 56	 56	
Adult	Avg.	Schooling	at	
Age	35-40	
16.9*	
(2.9)	
14.2*	
(2.9)	
14.6*	
(2.9)	
11.1*	
(2.1)	
8.4*	
(2.0)	
4.8**	
(2.3)	
4.8**	
(2.3)	
Pupil-Teacher	 Ratio	 in	
Primary	School	
-3.42*	
(1.28)	
-1.40	
(1.42)	
-1.48	
(1.39)	
-2.71*	
(1.00)	
-1.52	
(.94)	
-1.22	
(.90)	
	
School	Resources	(%	of	
GDP/child	pop	share)	
	 2.28**	
(.92)	
2.22**	
(.92)	
2.63*	
(.65)	
1.86*	
(.61)	
1.71*	
(.59)	
1.94*	
(.57)	
Central	Exit	Exam	 15.2	
(12.1)	
17.0	
(11.5)	
13.1	
(10.6)	
4.2	
(7.6)	
10.2	
(7.0)	
11.6	
(6.7)	
11.9	
(6.7)	
Private	Share	of	
Secondary	Enrolment	
22.1	
(34.2)	
17.5	
(32.5)	
	 	 	 	 	
Rule	of	Law	 	 	 	 	 90.7*	
(23.9)	
89.1*	
(28.0)	
100.2*	
(27.0)	
Individualism	 	 	 	 	 	 26.3	
(18.6)	
27.1	
(18.7)	
Long	Term	
Orientation	
	 	 	 	 	 30.1	
(16.0)	
33.2**	
(16.0)	
Confucian	
Tradition	
	 	 	 75.8*	
(10.5)	
68.4*	
(9.5)	
67.6*	
(12.0)	
64.2*	
(11.8)	
Constant	 314.7*	
(43.9)	
267.5*	
(45.6)	
270.8*	
(45.7)	
318.3*	
(33.1)	
284.0*	
(30.8)	
297.6*	
(30.0)	
265.8*	
(18.8)	
R2	 .59	 .63	 .62	 .81	 .85	 .87	 .87	
*Statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level	
**Statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level	
	
As	mentioned	earlier,	Fuchs	and	Woessmann	[2007]	attribute	cross-country	differences	
in	 average	 PISA	 scores	 to	 differences	 in	 family	 characteristics,	 school	 resources,	 and	 school	
system	characteristics.		Column	1	shows	the	results	with	a	model	that	includes	four	variables	that	
represent	these	three	proximate	factors:	the	average	 level	of	adult	schooling	(age	35-40),	the	
pupil-teacher	ratio	in	primary	school,	the	existence	of	a	central	exit	exam,	and	the	private	share	
of	 secondary	 school	enrollment.	 	 These	proximate	causes	explain	59%	of	 the	variation	 in	 the	
average	scores,	although	the	central	exit	exam	and	the	private	share	of	secondary	enrollment	
are	not	statistically	significant.	
Column	 2	 shows	 the	 results	 when	 the	 variable	 for	 pre-tertiary	 public	
expenditures/student	is	added	to	the	model.		This	variable	is	highly	statistically	significant	and	
raises	 the	 explained	 variation	 in	 the	model	 to	 63%,	but	 it	 greatly	 reduces	 the	 effect	 and	 the	
statistical	significance	of	the	pupil-teacher	ratio.			
Column	3	shows	the	results	when	the	private	share	of	secondary	school	enrollment	 is	
removed,	since	it	has	very	low	statistical	significance.		The	central	exit	exam	and	the	pupil-teacher	
ratio	have	noticeable	effects,	but	they	are	not	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.		Still,	the	
four	proximate	factors	in	this	model	explain	62%	of	the	variation	in	average	test	scores	across	
countries.			
The	four	family,	school,	and	school	system	characteristics	in	column	3	cannot	explain	the	
very	high	average	scores	in	the	East	Asian	countries	that	have	a	Confucian	tradition.		Column	4	
shows	the	results	when	a	dummy	variable	for	this	tradition	is	added	to	this	model.			This	variable	
has	a	huge	effect	 that	 is	highly	 statistically	 significant,	and	 it	 raises	 the	explained	variation	 in	
average	 test	 scores	 to	81%.	 	This	model	provides	very	 strong	evidence	 for	 the	 importance	of	
culture	in	the	determination	of	average	test	scores.					
Column	5	shows	the	results	when	the	Rule	of	Law	index	is	added	to	the	model.		Even	with	
the	other	proximate	causes	still	 in	 the	model,	 the	Rule	of	Law	has	a	huge,	highly	statistically-
significant	effect.		With	this	variable	included,	the	explained	variation	in	average	scores	rises	to	
85%.			
Column	6	 shows	 the	 results	when	 the	 two	most	 important	 cultural	 characteristics	are	
included	in	the	model.		These	variables	raise	the	total	explained	variation	to	87%,	but	they	are	
not	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	 	With	the	 inclusion	of	the	cultural	and	 institutional	
variables,	 the	 effect	 of	 parental	 schooling	 becomes	 much	 smaller	 and	 is	 only	 statistically	
significant	at	the	5%	level.	
	Overall	the	effect	of	parental	schooling	on	average	scores	declines	by	67%	when	cultural	
and	 institutional	characteristics	are	 included	 in	the	model.	 	These	results	 indicate	that	a	 large	
share	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 parental	 schooling	 on	 average	 scores	 is	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 cultural	 and	
institutional	causes	of	higher	scores,	which	raise	a	society’s	average	level	of	schooling.		
In	the	complete	model	the	effect	of	the	central	exit	exam	increases	to	ten	points,	and	it	
becomes	more	statistically	significant,	but	it	still	does	not	achieve	significance	at	the	5%	level.		
The	existence	of	this	exam	is	relatively	common	across	the	countries	in	the	data	set,	as	over	70%	
of	the	60	countries	require	it.		It	may	be	that	some	countries	have	adopted	the	exam	because	it	
has	become	the	fashion	in	educational	circles	to	do	so,	even	though	the	country	does	not	have	
the	cultural	characteristics	required	to	use	the	scores	from	this	exam	for	some	practical	purpose.					
Since	 the	 independent	 variables	 have	 different	 magnitudes,	 the	 magnitude	 of	 their	
estimated	 effects	 does	 not	 indicate	 their	 relative	 importance	 in	 determining	 average	 scores.		
Table	4	shows	the	effect	on	average	scores	of	changes	in	each	input	variable	from	its	minimum	
to	 its	 maximum	 value	 for	 three	models	 with	 different	mixes	 of	 fundamental	 and	 proximate	
causes.				The	interpretation	of	the	results	in	this	table	provides	a	guide	to	the	relative	importance	
of	the	various	cultural	and	other	national	characteristics	in	explaining	differences	in	average	PISA	
test	scores	between	countries.	 	 It	also	provides	an	 indication	of	how	much	changes	 in	certain	
characteristics	might	enable	countries	to	raise	their	scores.			
The	maximum	 variation	 in	 the	 input	 variables	 for	 the	model	with	 the	 four	 proximate	
causes	changes	average	scores	by	202	points.		The	maximum	variation	in	the	input	variables	in	
the	model	with	the	four	fundamental	causes	changes	average	scores	by	241	points.		Clearly	the	
fundamental	causes	explain	far	more	of	the	cross-country	variation	in	average	scores	than	the	
traditional	proximate	causes.		
	Table	4	
Effect	of	Culture	and	Institutions	on	Average	Test	Scores	
(Dependent	variable	is	average	score	on	PISA	2012	and/or	2015)		
	 Input	Values	 Proximate	
Causes	
Fundamental	
Causes	
Prox.	&	Fundamental	
Causes	
	 Min	 Max	 Effect	 Points	 Effect	 Points	 Effect	 Points	 Share	
Parents	Schooling	 7.0	 14.0	 14.6	 102.2	 	 	 4.8	 33.6	 	
School	Resources	 5.8	 34.5	 2.22	 63.7	 	 	 1.94	 55.7	 	
Pupil-Teacher	Ratio	 8.4	 23.6	 -1.48	 22.5	 	 	 	 	 	
Central	Exit	Exam	 0.0	 1.0	 13.1*	 13.1	 	 	 11.9*	 11.9	 	
Subtotal	 	 	 	 201.5	 	 	 	 101.2	 .37	
Confucian	Trad	 0.00	 1.00	 	 	 60.2		 60.2	 64.2	 64.2	 	
Rule	of	Law	 0.34	 0.89	 	 	 146.1	 80.4	 100.2	 55.1	 	
Individualism	 0.13	 0.91	 	 	 48.3	 37.7	 27.1*	 21.1	 	
LT	Orientation	 0.13	 1.00	 	 	 72.5	 63.1	 33.2	 28.9	 	
Subtotal	 	 	 	 	 	 241.4	 	 169.3	 .63	
Total	 	 	 	 201.5	 	 241.4	 	 270.5	 	
*Not	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level	
	
		When	both	sets	of	causes	are	 in	 the	model,	 the	maximum	variation	 in	all	 the	causes	
changes	average	scores	by	271	points,	which	 is	29	points	more	 than	 the	 fundamental	 causes	
alone.	 	 In	this	model	the	variation	 in	the	fundamental	causes	explains	63%	of	the	variation	 in	
average	scores	and	the	variation	 in	the	proximate	causes	explains	37%	of	the	variation	 in	the	
average	scores.		The	most	important	proximate	cause	in	the	mixed	model	is	the	level	of	financial	
resources	provided	to	schools.		
Hanushek	and	Woessmann	[2008]	argue	that	 just	providing	more	resources	to	schools	
will	not	reliably	 lead	to	 improved	student	performance	when	the	institutional	structure	 is	not	
changed.		This	may	be	true	in	rich	countries,	but	for	poor	countries	the	results	here	suggest	the	
opposite.		After	controlling	for	cultural	factors,	increasing	public	funding	for	schools	is	the	only	
policy	 option	 identified	 here	 that	 is	 associated	 with	 substantially	 higher	 average	 scores	 (55	
points).			
Even	 this	 effect	may	 be	 politically	 impossible	 to	 achieve	 because	 only	 countries	with	
certain	cultural	and	institutional	characteristics	are	willing	to	provide	substantial	public	resources	
to	schools.		Another	regression	(not	shown)	reveals	that	about	50%	of	the	variation	in	the	public	
resources	 provided	 to	 schools	 is	 explained	 by	 cultural	 and	 institutional	 characteristics,	which	
means	that	only	half	of	the	86	points	attributed	to	variations	in	public	resources	in	the	model	of	
proximate	causes	(i.e.,	43	points)	are	not	culturally	determined.			It	is	not	clear	if	even	this	level	
of	improvement	could	occur	quickly,	since	the	cross-sectional	analysis	is	this	study	is	implicitly	
measuring	a	log-run	effect.			
Fuchs	and	Woessmann	[2007]	ascribe	great	value	to	the	adoption	of	a	central	exit	exam	
as	a	means	to	raise	average	scores.		The	results	in	this	analysis	provide	some	support	for	their	
conclusion,	but	 the	effect	 is	only	significant	at	 the	10%	 level.	 	Rather	 the	results	suggest	 that	
cultural	and	institutional	changes	in	the	society	are	required	to	substantially	raise	these	scores.		
According	to	this	analysis,	the	adoption	of	a	central	exit	exam	might	raise	average	scores	by	12	
points,	 but	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 Confucian	 tradition	 that	 ties	 advancement	 in	 society	 to	 the	
achievement	of	high	scores	on	this	exam	raises	average	scores	by	64	more	points.		Absent	this	
tradition,	the	effect	of	a	central	exit	exam	seems	quite	limited.		
These	 results	 indicate	 that	 schools	 are	 relatively	 limited	 in	 their	 capability	 to	
independently	raise	students’	average	test	scores.		An	increase	in	school	resources	or	in	adults’	
average	 level	 of	 schooling	 can	 raise	 these	 scores,	 but	 societies´	 willingness	 to	 provide	more	
resources	to	raise	average	schooling	and	average	test	scores	is	itself	culturally	and	institutionally	
constrained.			
At	the	beginning	of	the	article,	reference	was	made	to	the	difference	in	scores	between	
Singapore	(569)	and	the	Dominican	Republic	(328).		Except	for	the	Individualism	trait,	in	which	
both	countries	score	low,	these	two	countries	are	generally	at	the	opposite	ends	of	the	range	of	
input	 values	 shown	 in	 Table	3.	 	 Singapore	has	higher	 average	 scores	primarily	 because	of	 its	
Confucian	 tradition,	 its	much	 higher	 commitment	 to	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law,	 its	 Long	 Term	Cultural	
Orientation,	 and	 its	much	higher	 average	 level	 of	 adult	 schooling.	 	 Singapore	 also	 expends	 a	
higher	share	of	its	GDP	on	public	education,	but	more	importantly,	the	share	of	its	population	
under	15	years	of	age	is	only	half	as	large	as	in	the	Dominican	Republic,	so	Singapore’s	share	of	
GDP	expended	per	student	is	much	higher.		In	addition,	parents	in	Singapore	often	augment	the	
higher	public	expenditure/student	with	their	own	expenditures	on	private	tutoring,	which	is	not	
common	in	the	Dominican	Republic	[Dang	and	Rogers,	2008].				
The	Dominican	Republic	has	the	lowest	reported	expenditures	on	public	education	as	a	
share	of	GDP	(2.1%	in	2007)	of	the	60	countries	included	in	the	data	set.		According	to	the	model	
results,	this	is	one	of	the	few	areas	where	a	change	in	education	policy	might	have	a	substantial	
positive	effect	on	students´	average	test	scores.		The	adoption	of	a	central	exit	exam	also	might	
have	a	positive	effect,	but	the	empirical	results	indicate	that	this	policy	(alone)	is	not	a	reliable	
strategy	for	raising	students´	average	scores.			
V.	 Conclusions	
Researchers	have	performed	many	studies	that	attribute	the	differences	in	international	
test	scores	to	student,	family,	school,	and	school	system	characteristics.		These	studies	do	not	
explain	why	these	characteristics	vary	so	much	across	countries.			
Institutionalists	argue	that	the	level	of	human	capital	in	each	country	has	both	proximate	
and	fundamental	causes.	 	Family,	school,	and	school	system	characteristics	are	the	proximate	
causes	of	a	country’s	level	of	human	capital,	but	cultural	and	institutional	characteristics	are	the	
fundamental	causes.			
In	 this	 analysis	 I	 examine	 the	 effect	 of	 various	 proximate	 and	 fundamental	 causes	 on	
students’	average	scores	on	the	PISA	2012	and/or	2015	mathematics	test.		I	show	that	while	a	
number	of	family,	school,	and	school	system	characteristics	can	explain	62%	of	the	variation	in	
average	scores	across	57	countries,	cultural	and	institutional	characteristics	can	explain	81%	of	
this	variation.		Adding	the	proximate	causes	to	the	model	of	fundamental	causes	only	raises	the	
explained	variation	in	average	scores	by	6%.					
I	find	little	evidence	that	changes	in	school	system	characteristics	affect	average	scores.		
The	 private	 share	 of	 enrollment	 in	 secondary	 school	 has	 no	 effect	 on	 average	 scores.	 	 The	
existence	of	a	central	exit	exam	is	associated	with	a	12-point	increase	in	average	scores,	but	this	
effect	is	only	statistically	significant	at	the	10%	level.			
I	find	a	substantial,	very	statistically	significant	effect	from	additional	public	expenditures	
on	pre-tertiary	schooling.		After	controlling	for	cultural	characteristics,	variations	in	this	indicator	
account	for	a	56-point	difference	in	average	scores.		But	it	is	not	clear	that	achieving	this	level	of	
improvement	 is	 feasible	 across	 countries	 because	 the	 evidence	 also	 indicates	 that	 whether	
countries	are	willing	to	provide	these	resources	is	itself	culturally-determined.			
In	contrast,	 I	 find	that	three	cultural	characteristics	and	one	 institutional	characteristic	
explain	 81%	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 average	 scores.	 	 The	 Confucian	 tradition	 explains	 60	 points.		
Differences	in	countries’	commitment	to	the	Rule	of	Law	explains	80	points.		Cultural	differences	
in	beliefs	with	respect	to	individualism	vs.	collectivism	and	a	long-run	vs.	a	short-run	orientation	
explain	another	100	points.			
These	results	reveal	the	importance	of	student	and	family	motivation	in	the	achievement	
of	high	test	scores.		Achievement	of	these	scores	is	difficult,	so	students	and	their	families	only	
make	the	commitment	to	achieve	high	scores	in	societies	that	provide	considerable	rewards	for	
their	achievement	or	considerable	penalties	for	the	failure	to	achieve	them.		Absent	this	student	
and	family	motivation	to	achieve	high	scores,	schools	and	school	systems	are	extremely	limited	
in	how	much	they	can	raise	student	scores.		Schools	and	families,	in	turn,	operate	as	agents	of	
the	larger	society.		They	respond	to	societal	incentives	with	respect	to	the	student	achievement	
of	cognitive	skills.			Average	scores	are	much	higher	in	countries	that	ascribe	more	importance	to	
the	achievement	of	cognitive	skills.		
The	results	in	this	analysis	indicate	that	over	time	cultural	and	institutional	factors	largely	
determine	students’	average	scores	on	standardized	tests.		If	governments	in	countries	with	low	
average	scores	want	to	raise	these	scores,	they	need	to	focus	their	attention	on	changing	the	
weak	incentives	for	student	achievement	in	their	societies.		The	results	here	indicate	that	they	
will	have	to	increase	the	societal	rewards	for	student	achievement	if	they	wish	to	see	substantial	
improvement	in	students’	average	scores.			
These	findings	also	may	explain	why	in	countries	with	numerous	subcultures,	students	in	
some	ethnic	groups	consistently	score	higher	on	standardized	tests	than	students	in	other	ethnic	
groups,	 even	 though	 they	 attend	 the	 same	 schools.	 Implicitly,	 the	 subcultures	 of	 the	 ethnic	
groups	with	the	higher	average	scores	ascribe	more	value	to	the	achievement	of	high	scores	than	
the	subcultures	of	the	other	groups,	so	in	these	subcultures	families	make	more	effort	to	assist	
(or	pressure)	their	students	to	achieve	higher	scores.	
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